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ONE CENTURY OF CONSTITUTIONAL HOME
RULE: A PROGRESS REPORT?
Abstrac" Despite constitutional and statutory provisions providing for home rule,
Washington municipalities continue to lack meaningful local autonomy. The author
examines the need for home rule and its genesis in the United States and Washington. In
addition, the author analyzes Washington case law in this area and concludes with consti-
tutional and judicial proposals designed to increase municipal self-governance.
The strength offree peoples resides in the local community. Local insti-
tutions are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they put it
within the people's reach; they teach people to appreciate its peaceful
enjoyment and accustom them to make use of it. Without local institu-
tions a nation may give itself a free government, but it has not got a
spirit of liberty.1
One hundred years ago, the framers of Washington's constitution
developed constitutional provisions laying out a framework to provide
local governments with the freedom to govern themselves in partner-
ship with the state. The Washington State legislature, in turn, created
a variety of statutory mechanisms designed to realize this objective.
The fundamental goal of these efforts was to give municipalities the
ability to control their own affairs. This, it was thought, would allow
municipalities to be more responsive to problems taking place in their
communities, and to solve these problems using local information and
insight with a minimum of delay. All this was to occur within a more
accountable political system.2  Despite these well-intentioned
attempts, however, in the last century home rule in Washington has
been marked by confusion and uncertainty. The troubled judicial rec-
ord must shoulder much of the blame.
This Comment discusses the need for and origin and history of
home rule in the United States and in Washington.' It examines the
Washington constitutional provisions for home rule, and develops an
analysis of the decisions by the Washington courts over the last hun-
dred years interpreting these provisions. Finally, this Comment pro-
vides recommendations for a number of structural changes which will,
I. A. DEToCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 63 (F. Bowen trans. 1945).
2. Andersen, The Current Meaning of Home Rule in Washington, 8 WASH. PUB. POL'Y
NoTEs No. 2 (1980).
3. Although home rule has escaped precise definition, the legal doctrine may be broadly
stated as "a particular method for distributing power between state and local government, i.e. a
grant of power to the electorate of a local government unit to frame and adopt a charter of
government." Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule, A Role for the
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 644-45 (1964).
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if adopted, create an environment more conducive to municipal home
rule in the state of Washington.
I. THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF HOME RULE IN THE
UNITED STATES
Home rule in the United States began with Missouri's adoption of
the first constitutional home rule provision in 1875.' This provision
was a synthesis of the two leading theories of municipal sovereignty
advocated in the mid-nineteenth century; one by Thomas M. Cooley,
and the other by John F. Dillon.
Throughout the history of the United States, the township has been
a fundamental unit of government. It should come as no suprise,
therefore, that until the last half of the nineteenth century, there was a
substantial amount of local autonomy in the United States.5 In the
nineteenth century, municipalities were the most important govern-
mental entities in most citizens' lives.6 Local governments spent more
money than the state and federal governments combined and wielded
a comparatively significant amount of power.7
As towns and cities increased in size and stature, however, state
legislatures began to increase their control over the municipal gov-
erning process. By the middle of the nineteenth century, "legislation
descended into regulation of the minutest details of municipal govern-
ment."8 At about this time, the explosion in railroad building began.
In their search for capital, the railroads first turned to state bonds.'
After a number of states passed constitutional provisions prohibiting
states from issuing railroad bonds, in response to a severe panic in
1837,10 the railroads turned to municipal bonds for revenue. "1 These
bonds were precariously perched on dreams of a rapid influx of new
4. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV.
269, 270 (1968).
5. See generally A. DETOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1 (discussing autonomy of local
governments).
6. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government. The Politics of
City Status in American Law, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 83, 100.
7. Id.
8. Sandalow, supra note 3, at 647 ("Cities were compelled by the legislature to buy lands for
parks and places because the owners wished to sell them; compelled to grade, pave, and sewer
streets without inhabitants, and for no other purpose than to award corrupt contracts for the
work." (quoting H. McBAIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF HOME RULE 9 (1916))).
9. Williams, supra note 6, at 142.
10. As a result of a severe financial panic in 1837, $40 million of railroad bonds were left
outstanding. Id.
11. The railroad interests successfully lobbied state legislatures to permit the issuance of
municipal bonds. The railroads quickly obtained their needed financing from cities and towns
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residents to purchase all the available farmland adjacent to the rail-
road line. When, in 1862, the'Supreme Court of Iowa ruled that the
state constitution forbade the issuance of municipal bonds, the for-
merly precarious situation developed into a near panic.
12
A. Cooley's Theory of Municipgl Home Rule
Thomas M. Cooley, a Michigan Supreme Court justice, developed
his theory of municipal power during a period in history when the
need for capital, brought on by the explosion of railroad building,
exacerbated the existing tension in the competition for power between
municipalities and state legislatures.13 Although these railroad bond
panics were by no means the sole source of inspiration for Cooley's
theories on home rule (or Dillon's), they did serve to underscore his
fear of special interests, and thus played a significant role in his theo-
ries' development.' 4 Cooley's belief in municipal autonomy owed
much to this fear of special interests and the power they could
obtain. 5 Thus, he felt that the railroad lobbyists' success in persuad-
ing the state legislatures to allow the issuance of municipal bonds,
demonstrated that unlimited power vested in the state legislatures
resulted in the exploitation of the majority of citizens by a powerful
elite.6 He theorized that, rather than limit the municipality, the
proper response was to limit the state government.' 7 By inherent right
to self-government Cooley did not mean to suggest, however, that the
ideal state would consist of a number of localities wholly autonomous
from the state, but rather that the state and local governments should
share power.' 8 Although Cooley's theories were incorporated into a
whose gullible leaders, blinded by overly optimistic hopes of becoming the next boomtown,
issued large offerings of local bonds. Id.
12. Although the United States Supreme Court in Gelpcke v. Dubuque, I Wall. 175 (1864),
later overruled the Iowa court, the Iowa ruling caused a number of cities to repudiate their bond
issues which in turn created economic uncertainty and instability throughout the business
community. Id. at 94.
13. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1927). This was one of
the most respected treatises of its time. One commentator has referred to it as "America's
second Constitution." Williams, supra note 6, at 88 (quoting Paludan, Law and the Failure of
Reconstruction: The Case of Thomas Cooley, 33 J. HisT. IDEAS 597, 598 (1972)).
14. Williams, supra note 6, at 147.
15. Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism'" A Reconsideration, 53 J.
AM. HIsT. 751, 756 (1967).
16. Williams, supra note 6, at 142.
17. Id. at 147.
18. Cooley wrote:
The state may mould local institutions according to its views of policy and expediency; but
local government is a matter of absolute right; and the state cannot take it away. It would
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number of state constitutional provisions providing for limited munici-
pal self-governance, today most states, including Washington, reject a
theory of inherent local sovereignty.1 9
B. Dillon's Theory of Municipal Home Rule
John F. Dillon's theory of municipal power, formulated shortly
after the municipal bond crisis during his tenure as an Iowa Supreme
Court justice, was more readily accepted.2" He believed, contrary to
Justice Cooley's views, that municipalities were the governmental
entity most subject to abuse. He developed Dillon's Rule
accordingly.21
Dillon's Rule, a long-standing principle of judicial interpretation,22
states that local governments have those powers expressly conferred
by state constitutional provisions, state statutes, and, where applicable,
the home rule charter; those powers necessarily or fairly implied in, or
incident to, the powers expressly granted; and those powers essential
to the declared objects and purposes of the municipality or quasi-cor-
poration.23 Under Dillon's Rule, a municipality will have no power
unless it is granted under one of these three categories.24
State judiciaries routinely use Dillon's Rule as a tool to limit munic-
ipal self-government and maintain legislative supremacy. Many state
judiciaries still use the Rule today to define the scope of municipal
be the boldest mockery to speak of a city as possessing municipal liberty where the state not
only shaped its government, but at its discretion sent in its own agents to administer it; or to
call that system one of constitutional freedom under which it should be equally admissible
to allow the people full control in their local affairs, or no control at all.
People ex rel. Leroy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 108 (1871), quoted in Williams, supra note 6, at
148.
19. At one time as many as four states-Michigan, Indiana, Iowa, and Kentucky-accepted
this doctrine. 0. REYNOLDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 66 (1982). The Washington Supreme
Court has firmly rejected this theory of inherent local government. In re Cloherty, 2 Wash. 137,
139-40, 27 P. 1064, 1065 (1891).
20. J. DILLON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1872). The bond
panic affected Dillon's theorizing as evidenced in the preface of his work: "[I]t has,
unfortunately, become quite too common with us to confer upon our [municipal] corporations
extraordinary powers, such as the authority to aid in the construction of railways, or other
undertakings, which are better left to private capital . I..." d. at 102, quoted in Williams, supra
note 6, at 94; see infra note 21.
21. Dillon's Rule continues to be universally recognized by American jurisdictions. 1 E.
MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 8 (3d ed. 1971).
22. Andersen, supra note 2.
23. See, e.g., 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 19, at 139.
24. 1 J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237, at
448-50 (5th ed. 1911) ("Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of
power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied."). Id. at
449-50.
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powers.25 The Washington Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed its
commitment to the use of Dillon's Rule in construing home rule
grants.26
II. HOME RULE IN WASHINGTON
Washington was the third state to adopt constitutional provisions
providing for home rule.27 Both sections 10 and 11 of article XI were
drafted and accepted during the Constitutional Convention of 1889.
The provisions passed through the convention with little substantive
debate.28 As in Missouri and California, the Washington constitu-
tional drafters attempted to design provisions which provided munici-
palities with the local sovereignity advocated by Cooley, while at the
same time, in recognition of Dillon's advocation for legislative
supremacy, limiting the scope of this sovereignity.
The final version of article XI, section 10 provides any city with a
population of 20,000 or more with a self-executing grant of power to
frame a charter for its own government, subject to the constitution and
laws of the state.29 The Washington Supreme Court has interpreted
the provision to "give to cities ... the largest measure of local self-
government . . ."30 and to "[r]ecognize that large, growing cities
should be empowered to determine for themselves, and in their own
way, the many important and complex questions of local policy which
arise." 3
All power granted to cities under section 10, however, must be
"consistent with and subject to the constitution and laws of this
state."3 Section 10 relies upon section 11 and its judicial interpreta-
tion to define the boundaries of the scope of power. Section 11 pro-
vides that: "[A]ny county, city, town or township may make and
25. See generally 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 19, cbs. 6, 8 (discussing use of Dillon's Rule in
American jurisdictions).
26. Tacoma v. Taxpayers of the City of Tacoma, 108 Wash. 2d 679, 743 P.2d 793 (1987).
27. Missouri developed the first constitutional provision in 1875, followed by California in
1879. Vanlandingham, supra note 4, at 270, 284-86.
28. Q. SMITH, AN ANALYTICAL INDEX OF THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889 723-24 (1964).
29. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 10 (1889, amended 1964). The remainder of the provision
expressly provides the manner by which a municipality may amend a charter, including public
notice requirements. In 1964, the legislature adopted amendment 40, which reduced the
population requirement to 10,000 and slightly altered the notice requirements. Id.
30. Malette v. City of Spokane, 77 Wash. 205, 224, 137 P. 496, 503 (1913).
31. Hilzinger v. Gillman, 56 Wash. 228, 234, 105 P. 471, 474 (1909).
32. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 10.
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enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regu-
lations [ordinances] as are not in conflict with general laws."3 3
An examination of section 11 reveals that it grants to specified
municipalities the power to enact local ordinances as long as they do
not conflict with general laws. The Washington Supreme Court has
attempted to define the scope of this grant as well as the import of this
limitation.
A. Scope of Grant of Power
Section 11 was taken nearly verbatim from the California Constitu-
tion and caused no published debate when passed at the constitutional
convention. 34 The express language of the provision seems to provide
a broad grant of power to municipalities. However, the courts' inter-
pretation of this language has created a different result.
The supreme court rejected Cooley's doctrine of inherent self-gov-
ernment shortly after the adoption of the home rule provisions.
Despite occasional judicial statements intimating an adoption of the
theory, the majority of cases hold that a municipality in Washington
has no inherent powers.3 6 Thus, in this state, there are no implied
constitutional limitations on the legislature. Accordingly, all munici-
pal powers must come from the constitutional provisions or legislative
delegations.37
Rejecting the inherent right to local sovereignty, the supreme court
has long applied Dillon's Rule and construed constitutional grants of
power strictly. The court has consistently held that a municipality's
authority to act must be found in an express grant by the legislature or
a power vested in it by the constitution.38 In Massie v. Brown,39 the
supreme court addressed the question whether the City of Seattle had
the authority to apply its civil service provisions, including the
requirement for examinations, to warrant server applicants. The court
held that because there was no express delegation of this power by the
legislature and the legislature had an interest in civil service employ-
33. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11.
34. Q. SMITH, supra note 28, at 728-29.
35. In re Cloherty, 2 Wash. 137, 139-40, 27 P. 1064, 1065 (1891).
36. Trautman, Legislative Control of Municipal Corporations in Washington, 38 WASH. L.
REv. 743, 746-48 (1964). The term "municipality" is used throughout this Comment to refer to
any home rule city, town or county.
37. Id. at 768.
38. See, e.g., City of Spokane v. J.R. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d 722, 726, 585 P.2d 784, 786 (1978).
This construction applies to municipal laws as well as charter provisions. See, &g., State ex rel.
Lynch v. Fairley, 76 Wash. 332, 136 P. 374 (1913).
39. 84 Wash. 2d 490, 527 P.2d 476 (1974).
Vol. 64:155, 1989
Constitutional Home Rule
ment procedures, Seattle did not have this authority.' The court rea-
soned that "[w]hen the interest of the State is paramount to or joint
with that of the municipal corporation, the municipal corporation has
no power to act absent a delegation from the legislature.
41
If strictly interpreted, this holding could be applied to make local
governments wholly dependent on the legislature for their powers,
regardless of the local government's home rule status. Since the state
would likely have at least a joint interest in almost any municipal
action taken, a municipality would have to wait for a legislative dele-
gation before it could exercise any power. At a minimum, the uncer-
tainty as to whether an action is purely local or one of joint interest
would severely limit home rule powers.
Frequently, however, courts will temper this strict holding in Massie
when interpreting a municipality's home rule powers. Courts take into
consideration a number of factors in determining whether to liberally
construe the scope of these powers. These factors are implied powers,
the type of power exercised, the type of municipality, the local nature
of the subject matter, and the reasonableness of the charter or
ordinance.
L Implied Powers
In addition to powers granted a municipality through express dele-
gation by the legislature or the constitution, the Washington Supreme
Court has frequently recognized, in conjunction with Dillon's Rule,
that home rule municipalities may possess implied or necessary pow-
ers.42 Although courts have often upheld municipal power grants on
the basis of implied powers, they have issued few judicial statements
explaining under what circumstances a power may or may not be
implied. The supreme court has held that a power may be necessarily
implied when the power arises from those expressly granted, when the
power may be reasonably inferred from the powers expressly granted,
and when those powers are essential to give effect to powers expressly
granted.43 The critical test appears to be the last one.
Thus, in Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. City of Seattle,44
where a statute granted the city power to provide for a sewer system as
well as the power to control, regulate, and manage it, the court held
40. Id. at 495-96, 527 P.2d at 477-79.
41. Id. at 492, 527 P.2d at 477.
42. See Note, A Cry for Reform in Construing Washington Municipal Corporation Statutes, 59
WASH. L. REV. 653, 654-57 (1984).
43. State v. Superior Court, 93 Wash. 267, 269, 160 P. 755, 756 (1916).
44. 57 Wash. 2d 446, 357 P.2d 863 (1960).
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that despite the absence of an express provision granting the power to
pledge city revenues to pay for sewage disposal services, an implied
grant of power would suffice.45
Washington courts have similarly held that an ordinance governing
hobby kennel licenses necessarily implied that the county animal con-
trol division had the power to deny applications for those licenses;46
that the City of Seattle, being empowered to conduct ferry operations
and collect tolls, had implied authority to maintain landings and
approaches;47 that the power to contract was necessarily implied from
a grant empowering the city to distribute a municipal water supply;4
and that the power to purchase liability insurance was implied from
the power to conduct necessarily insurable activities.49
The Washington Supreme Court has recently ignored its previous
holdings broadly construing implied powers, however. In Chemical
Bank v. WPPSS,50 the court defined the proper test for implied powers
as "legal necessity rather than practical necessity."51 Although this
interpretation seems to seriously limit implied powers in Washington,
it has not been relied upon since this opinion. It is difficult to predict
what future effect this decision may have on home rule powers.
2. Type of Power Exercised in Ordinance or Charter
The Washington courts may also take into consideration the type of
power exercised when determining the scope of municipal powers.52
Although section 10 provides for municipal authority to enact ordi-
nances on local police, sanitary, and other affairs, the supreme court
has placed a stronger emphasis on police power, while deemphasizing
the other subject matters. In Kimmel v. City of Spokane,53 for exam-
45. The court reasoned, "It must follow that with the power to provide a sewer system there
is implied the power to pay for it." Id. at 460, 357 P.2d at 872.
46. Stegriy v. King County Bd. of Appeals, 39 Wash. App. 346, 353, 693 P.2d 183, 191
(1984).
47. Hart v. King County, 104 Wash. 485, 492, 177 P. 344, 346 (1918).
48. Scott Paper Co. v. City of Anacortes, 90 Wash. 2d 19, 29, 578 P.2d 1292, 1297 (1978).
49. Hunter v. North Mason School Dist., 85 Wash. 2d 810, 817, 539 P.2d 845, 849-50 (1975);
see also Ayers v. City of Tacoma, 6 Wash. 2d 545, 554, 108 P.2d 348, 352 (1940) (city has
implied power to offer pension program); Armstrong v. City of Seattle, 180 Wash. 39, 42, 38 P.2d
377, 378 (1934) (power to operate stone or asphalt plant implies the power to condemn).
50. 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983).
51. Id. at 792, 666 P.2d at 340. ("[I]f the legislature has not authorized the action in
question, it is invalid no matter how necessary it might be." (quoting Hillis Homes, Inc. v.
Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 804, 808, 650 P.2d 193, 195 (1982))).
52. See Note, supra note 42, at 656.
53. 7 Wash. 2d 372, 109 P.2d 1069 (1941); see also Detamore v. Hindley, 83 Wash. 322, 326,
145 P. 462, 463 (1915) (a city has police powers "as ample within its limits as that possessed by
the Legislature").
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ple, the supreme court, after citing section 11, stated that: "[T]he court
accords to municipalities plenary police power within their limits." 4
The cases imply that section 11 is the basis for municipal police power
and nothing else.
This police power construction is significantly broader than that
generally allowed under the holding in Massie. The cases hold that
municipalities may enact police power regulations regardless of the
state's paramount or joint interests and the lack of the state's prior
express authorization, as long as the regulations are local and are not
in conflict with general laws or the constitution. 5 Thus, cities have
enacted valid police power ordinances prohibiting the opening of thea-
ters on Sunday, 6 regulating massage parlors,57 and establishing
plumbing standards.5"
On the other hand, courts generally have strictly interpreted munic-
ipal power regarding eminent domain and taxation. In In re Seattle, 59
for example, the supreme court invalidated a Seattle ordinance con-
demning land for a retail shopping facility (Westlake Project) when
there was no statute providing authority for such a condemnation.
The court held that a municipality's power to condemn must be con-
ferred in express terms or be necessarily implied.' The court also
held that all statutes delegating eminent domain power must be
strictly construed, subject, however, to the intent of the legislature.61
The supreme court has strictly construed taxation statutes as well.
In Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 62 for example, the court
held that although section 11 delegates extensive police power to
municipalities, it does not provide authority to tax, absent a grant
from the legislature.6 3 The court has consistently required express
authority when a municipality attempts to levy taxes.64
54. 7 Wash. 2d at 374, 109 P.2d at 1070.
55. Id.
56. In re Ferguson, 80 Wash. 102, 141 P. 322 (1914).
57. City of Spokane v. Bostrom, 12 Wash. App. 116, 528 P.2d 500 (1974).
58. State ex rel Rhodes v. Cook, 72 Wash. 2d 436, 433 P.2d 677 (1967).
59. 96 Wash. 2d 616, 638 P.2d 549 (1981).
60. Id. at 629, 638 P.2d at 557.
61. Id.
62. 97 Wash. 2d 804, 650 P.2d 193 (1982).
63. Id. at 809, 650 P.2d at 195. "If the Legislature has not authorized the tax, it is invalid no
matter how necessary it might be." Id. at 808, 650 P.2d at 195.
64. See, ag., Pacific First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Pierce County, 27 Wash. 2d 347, 353,
178 P.2d 351, 354 (1947).
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3. Type of Municipality Enacting the Ordinance or Charter
Section 10 directs the legislature to provide, by general laws, for the
incorporation of cities and towns by population size. In accordance
with this provision, the legislature has adopted two mutually exclusive
titles of the Revised Code of Washington ("Code") under which
municipalities may choose to operate. The powers granted to a local
government are determined in part by the applicable statutory
provisions.
The Code classifies municipalities on the basis of population. Cities
over 20,000 are classified as first-class cities and those with fewer than
20,000 are further classified by size as second-, third-, or fourth-class
cities.65 Generally, cities, other than first-class cities, are bound solely
by Dillon's Rule.66 First-class cities are provided far greater powers.67
In 1967, the legislature adopted the Optional Municipal Code.68
This code divides cities into two classes, those with a charter and those
without. To become a charter "code" city, the city must enact its own
charter and have a population over 10,000.69 Optional code cities are
provided with powers similar to those of first-class cities.
The courts have taken into consideration the type of municipality
when defining the scope of municipal powers and have, in a number of
cases, liberally construed these powers when dealing with first-class or
code cities. For example, in United States v. Town of North Bonne-
ville,70 North Bonneville, a code city, was to be relocated because a
portion of a hydroelectric powerhouse project required the destruction
of a significant area of the town. The town entered into a contract
with the United States Army Corps of Engineers to purchase land in
contemplation of the town's relocation. The Corps later challenged
65. WASH. REV. CODE, §§ 35.01.010-.040 (1987).
66. Trautman, supra note 36, at 773.
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.22.570 (1987) provides:
Any [first-class] city adopting a charter under the provisions of this chapter shall have all
the powers which are conferred upon incorporated cities and towns by this title or other
laws of the state, and all such powers as are usually exercised by municipal corporations of
like character and degree."
In addition, WASH. REV. CODE § 35.22.900 (1987) provides: "The rule that statutes in deroga-
tion of the common law are to be strictly construed shall have no application to this chapter, but
the same shall be liberally construed for the purpose of carrying out the objects for which this
chapter is intended."
68. 1967 Wash. Laws 554 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.11.020 (1987)).
69. WASH. REV. CODE § 35A. 11.050 (1987) provides: "The general grant of municipal power
conferred by this chapter [on all code cities] ... is intended to confer the greatest power of local
self-government consistent with the Constitution of this state and shall be liberally construed in
favor of such cities."
70. 94 Wash. 2d 827, 621 P.2d 127 (1980).
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the validity of this contract, arguing that the acquisition of land was
beyond the town's authority and thus unconstitutional.71 The
supreme court, ignoring the holding in Massie, did not address the
question of whether there was a paramount or joint state and local
interest. The court instead focused on the broad powers of self-gov-
ernment afforded by the Optional Municipal Code and held that,
absent a general prohibition against land transactions, North Bonne-
ville was indeed authorized to contract to purchase the land.72
The supreme court has treated first-class cities with similiar defer-
ence. In Daggs v. City of Seattle,73 three plaintiffs challenged the city's
right to enact an ordinance requiring plaintiffs to file a claim with the
city before commencing a tort action against the city.74 The court's
analysis consisted entirely of an examination of the constitution, state
statutes, and the city charter to see if the ordinance contravened any of
them. Finding no general laws conflicting with the ordinance, the
court held that the ordinance was a valid exercise of municipal
power.75
These decisions, along with those construing general police powers,
imply that a first-class or code city no longer must consider whether
the state has a paramount or joint interest. As long as the powers they
exercise do not contravene any constitutional provisions, state general
laws, or the city's charter, they are free to enact ordinances without
express legislative delegation. In addition, the courts have held that
Dillon's Rule, which resolves doubts over power grants against munic-
ipalities, does not apply to first-class cities.76 These holdings would
presumably apply to code cities as well. Although these cases appear
to make the strict construction of Massie no longer meaningful for
first-class and code cities, Massie may not be dead yet.
In Chemical Bank v. WPPSS,77 the court adopted. the reasoning of
Massie to hold that first-class and code cities lacked the power to enter
71. Id. at 830-31, 621 P.2d at 128-29.
72. Id. at 835, 621 P.2d at 131; see also Shaw Disposal v. City of Auburn, 15 Wash. App. 65,
66, 546 P.2d 1236, 1238 (1976) (non-charter code cities may contract for any manner of garbage
disposal service as long as the contract does not conflict with the constitution or a general law).
73. 110 Wash. 2d 49, 750 P.2d 626 (1988).
74. If the plaintiffs had waited the requisite 60 days under the ordinance, their cases would
have been subject to the Tort Reform Act. Id. at 57, 750 P.2d at 627.
75. Id.;see also State v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 162, 615 P.2d 461 (1980); Winkenwerder
v. City of Yakima, 52 Wash. 2d 617, 622, 328 P.2d 873, 878 (1958) (powers of first-class cities are
as broad as the legislature's powers subject to legislative restrictions); infra text accompanying
note 106.
76. Winkenwerder v. City of Yakima, 52 Wash. 2d 617, 622, 328 P.2d 873, 878 (1958).
77. 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1984).
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into a financing agreement. 78 The court held that because of at least a
joint state interest, the municipalities must have express or implied
"legally necessary" authority for their actions.79 A recent decision,
Tacoma v. Taxpayers of the City of Tacoma,8 o although not mention-
ing Massie, also emphasized legislative supremacy. The court stated
that the city of Tacoma, a first-class city, was wholly subject to Dil-
lon's Rule, including the clause providing that doubts are to be
decided against the municipality.8 1 Although the court eventually
ruled in favor of the city, this ruling, if consistently followed, would
seriously undermine the status of first-class cities.
It is too early to tell if these cases signify a trend away from broad
construction or are merely a temporary resurrection of Dillon's Rule.
One of the more recent cases on point, Daggs v. City of Seattle, liber-
ally construed the scope of municipal powers of these cities8 2 and
ignored the holdings of the cases just discussed. This may be a sign of
things to come.
4. Subject Matter of Ordinance or Charter: Local Affairs
In Washington, a municipality does not have complete autonomy
over decisions of a purely local nature. Unlike other states, where a
municipality is free to enact ordinances dealing with municipal affairs
without legislative intervention, in Washington the legislature may
enact superseding general laws on any subject matter, local or state.83
However, the court has recognized a niche where, although not com-
pletely autonomous from the state, a municipality may act upon exclu-
sively local matters without a delegation from the legislature. 84 The
supreme court, in Massie, left some room in which municipalities may
maneuver. Massie required express legislative authorization only in
areas of paramount or joint state concern.85 Because the state legisla-
ture could be considered to have at least a joint concern in nearly any
area of the law, this local affairs niche is rather small. A modern case
suggests that this area may be broadening, however.
In City of Issaquah v. Teleprompter Corp.,86 the supreme court held
that a municipal action having some statewide effect would not render
78. Id. at 793-94, 666 P.2d at 340.
79. Id. at 793, 666 P.2d at 340.
80. 108 Wash. 2d 679, 743 P.2d 793 (1987).
81. Id. at 692, 743 P.2d at 799-800.
82. 110 Wash. 2d 49, 54, 750 P.2d 626, 629 (1988).
83. Trautman, supra note 36, at 768.
84. Id. at 772.
85. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
86. 93 Wash. 2d 567, 611 P.2d 741 (1980).
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it non-local, thus requiring an express delegation of authority. The
court reasoned that although municipal ownership of a cable television
system would have some statewide significance, it was not of such a
magnitude as to require an express legislative authorization.87 This
decision carves out a significant subject matter area where a munici-
pality may be free to act without express delegation. In contrast to the
rule in Massie, a municipality, under this holding, may act without
express delegation in matters of joint state and local concern and in
matters that are purely local. The legislature would still, of course,
have the power to enact superseding laws in all areas, including those
affecting purely local affairs.
5. Reasonableness of Regulation or Charter
The supreme court has long held that for a municipal power to be
valid, it must be reasonable.8 8 This factor is given particular emphasis
in cases involving an exercise of municipal police power.89 The court
has formulated a two-part test to determine when an ordinance is rea-
sonable, and thus constitutional.
Initially, a court inquires whether the ordinance is reasonably neces-
sary to protect the public safety, health, morals, or general welfare. A
court then inquires whether the ordinance is substantially related to
the ends established by the first inquiry. ° If both inquiries are satis-
fied, the court will uphold the ordinance.
Courts generally are highly deferential to the municipality's judg-
ments and will ordinarily uphold an ordinance as reasonable. The
supreme court has held that "[i]f the court can reasonably conceive of
a state of facts'which would warrant the legislation, those facts will be
presumed to exist." 9' However, the courts have not hesitated to hold
otherwise. 92
B. Limitation on Grant of Power to Municipalities
The courts' holdings regarding the scope of the limitation on the
grant of power are also somewhat ambiguous. The grant of power to
home rule cities under sections 10 and 11 is limited by the clause "as
87. Id. at 572-73, 611 P.2d at 744-45.
88. See, eg., Hass v. City of Kirkland, 78 Wash. 2d 929, 932, 481 P.2d 9, 11 (1971).
89. Id.
90. Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash. 2d 19, 26-27, 586 P.2d 860, 866 (1978).
91. Id. at 27, 586 P.2d at 866.
92. See, e-g., Patton v. City of Bellingham, 179 Wash. 566, 574, 38 P.2d 364, 367 (1934)
(ordinance prescribing hours for opening and closing barber shops unreasonable).
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are not in conflict with general laws." 93 In some states, a constitu-
tional home rule provision limits the legislature's action in municipal
affairs. In Washington, however, the only constitutional limitation is
placed upon the municipality. The supreme court has held that in the
event of a conflict, the state's general law will always supersede a
municipal ordinance.9 4  Thus, determining when a conflict exists
becomes critical.
1. Definition of General Laws
Article XI, sections 10 and 11, provide that a municipal ordinance
may not conflict with general laws. Section 10 also provides that even
if conflicting, a "special law" cannot supersede a municipal law.95 It is
therefore of vital importance in a determination of conflict, to distin-
guish between special and general legislation. The supreme court has
defined general and special laws as the following:
A special law is one which relates to particular persons or things, while
a general law is one which applies to all persons or things of a class. A
law is general when it operates upon all persons or things constituting a
class, even though such class consists of but one person or thing; but the
law must be so framed that all persons or things constituting the class
come within its provisions.96
The judicial recognition of this distinction is important to effective
home rule. Disregarding this distinction allows the legislature to enact
laws directed at a single municipality, robbing the home rule grant of
nearly any substance. For that reason, nearly all states where home
rule is effectively practiced have eliminated special legislation.97
Although the legislature may regulate the powers of cities only by
general legislation, all cities do not have to be treated as one class. For
example, the legislature may validly distinguish between cities on the
basis of population.9" A general law classification must simply bear a
93. WASH. CONST. art. XI, §§ 10, 11.
94. State ex rel. Seattle v. Carson, 6 Wash. 250, 33 P. 428 (1893).
95. Martin v. Tollefson, 24 Wash. 2d 211, 216-17, 163 P.2d 594, 596-97 (1945).
96. Y.M.C.A. of Seattle v. Parish, 89 Wash. 495, 497-98, 154 P. 785 (1916); Trautman, supra
note 36, at 758.
97. Vanlandingham, Symposium: Problems in Constitutional Law; Constitutional Municipal
Home Rule since theAMA (NLC) Model, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 6 n.13 (1975).
98. City of Seattle v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 663, 674, 694 P.2d 641, 653 (1985). However, these
classifications may serve to thwart home rule. Home rule may be diminished through the use of
special legislation disguised as general legislation in the form of "population acts."
Vanlandingham, supra note 97, at 6 n.13.
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rational relatibnship to the purpose and subject matter of the legisla-
tion for the classification to be upheld.9 9
2. Inconsistency Between a Municipal Law and a General Law
a. Direct Conflict
The basic test applied in determining conflict is whether or not a
municipal ordinance permits that which a general law prohibits or vice
versa."° When a local and state law directly conflict, the state law
will always supersede the local law. For example, in State v. City of
Seattle, 10 the University of Washington challenged the city's right to
declare state property a landmark, alleging that it directly conflicted
with state law. This state law provided that the university would, upon
expiration of the lease or acquisition by the university, have the power
to "raze, reconstruct, alter, remodel or add to existing buildings
,,102
The court held that the laws governing the buildings were general
laws and not special laws, since they applied to all things in the class
of university properties.103 The court also held that the ordinance
effectively forbade the alterations allowed by the legislature. Thus, the
two laws directly conflicted and the court declared the ordinance
invalid. "o
b. Concurrent Jurisdiction
Even when a municipal law deals with the same subject matter as a
state law, the court will not reject it as conflicting if the court finds
that the state and municipality may exercise their powers concur-
rently. State statutes are not interpreted as denying a power to a
municipality unless the intent to preempt is express.10 5 The courts will
attempt to harmonize conflicting laws.10 6 In State v. Everett District
Court,' 0 7 the supreme court reversed a court of appeals ruling that a
state law, which provided regulations for the safety and operation of
boats, conflicted with a municipal ordinance prohibiting the use of
99. State ex rel Lindsey v. Derbyshire, 79 Wash. 227, 234, 140 P. 540, 544 (1914).
100. City of Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wash. 2d 106, 111, 356 P.2d 292, 296 (1960).
101. 94 Wash. 2d 162, 615 P.2d 461 (1980).
102. Id. at 166, 615 P.2d at 463.
103. Id.
104. Id.; see also State v. Inglis, 32 Wash. App. 700, 701-02, 649 P.2d 163, 164-65 (1982)
(state statute overrules ordinance when both define the same crime of prostitution).
105. State v. Everett Dist. Court, 92 Wash. 2d 106, 108, 594 P.2d 448, 450 (1979); Nelson v.
City of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 862, 866, 395 P.2d 82, 84-85 (1964).
106. 94 Wash. 2d 162, 166, 615 P.2d 461, 463 (1980).
107. 92 Wash. 2d 106, 108, 594 P.2d 448, 450 (1979).
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boats on a specific lake. The court found that because there was no
express statement or clear intent in the state law permitting motor
boats on all state waters, no conflict existed, and both laws could con-
tinue to be effective concurrently.10 8
The court has been more hesitant to harmonize state and municipal
laws when the statutes involved concern criminal matters. Foremost
among the reasons against concurrent jurisdiction is the prohibition
against double jeopardy. The court has stated that convictions under
two laws, prohibiting the same offense, violates double jeopardy
prohibitions. 109 Nevertheless, the court has allowed concurrent crimi-
nal jurisdiction in some instances. " 0
c. Ordinance or Charter Less Rigorous than General Law
The courts generally invalidate municipal laws that are less rigorous
than state laws. Although not expressly conflicting, a less rigorous
municipal law may potentially allow behavior restricted under the
more rigorous state law. For instance, in Town of Republic v.
Brown," a municipal ordinance defined a person as presumably
intoxicated when the person's blood alcohol content reached a level of
0.10 percent or greater. The ordinance did not provide for a
mandatory prison sentence. The state law, in contrast, stated that a
person was conclusively intoxicated when a person's blood alcohol
reached a level of 0.10 percent or greater. The state law also provided
for a mandatory jail sentence. The supreme court held that these dif-
ferences necessarily invalidated the municipal law." 2
d. Ordinance or Charter More Rigorous than General Law
The courts are much less inclined to invalidate a municipal law
which is more rigorous than a state law. The rationale is that a munic-
ipal law does not conflict with a state law regulating the same subject
matter where the municipal law merely adds to the state
requirements." 13
108. Id. at 107-08, 594 P.2d at 448.
109. State v. Ensminger, 77 Wash. 2d 535, 536, 463 P.2d 612, 614 (1970).
110. See, e.g., State v. Roybal, 82 Wash. 2d 577, 512 P.2d 718, 720-21 (1973) (that a
municipal ordinance and a state statute both regulating concealment of a weapon each included a
separate element was enough to allow for concurrent jurisdiction).
111. 97 Wash. 2d 915, 652 P.2d 955 (1982).
112. Id. at 920, 652 P.2d at 958.
113. City of Bellingham v. Cissna, 44 Wash. 397, 403, 87 P. 481, 482 (1906).
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For example, in Lenci v. City of Seattle, 114 the state had enacted a
law regulating motor vehicle wrecking yards, requiring a fence or wall
of at least six feet. The City of Seattle, deeply concerned with local
crime prevention, enacted a law regulating the same yards, but
required an enclosure at least eight feet high. The supreme court held
that this was a valid exercise of municipal police power, and thus there
was no conflict.1 1
5
e. Preemption by the Legislature
A general law may also conflict with a municipal law or charter
through express or implied legislative preemption. Express preemption
occurs when the legislature expressly declares its intent to have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over a particular subject matter.1 6 For example, in
1969 the state legislature enacted the Washington State Explosives
Act.117 This Act provided extensive regulations on handguns and
ammunition. In addition to the regulations, the state included a pro-
viso expressly stating its intent to exercise exclusive jurisdiction."18
Even if the legislature has not expressly spoken on the issue of pre-
emption, a court may infer an intent to preempt.119 A variety of fac-
tors, including the quantity and specificity of state law on the subject,
determine whether the legislature has preempted municipal power by
implication. The court's weighing of state and local interests is well
illustrated by the leading case in this field, City of Spokane v. Portch. 120
In Portch, the City of Spokane had enacted an ordinance defining
obscenity and making it a misdemeanor to sell or distribute obscene
materials, punishable by a maximum fine of $500 or six months in
prison, or both.1 2
1
The state had previously enacted a statute almost identical to the
municipal law, except for the obscenity definition.122 Portch, convicted
under the Spokane ordinance, argued that the city was without
authority to enact a local ordinance because the state had preempted
this subject area. The court was unable to find any state provision
114. 63 Wash. 2d 664, 670-71, 388 P.2d 926, 928-30 (1964).
115. Id. at 677, 388 P.2d at 934.
116. Id. at 670, 388 P.2d at 930.
117. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.74.201 (1987).
118. "Provided, That the state shall be deemed to have preempted the field of regulation of
small arms ammunition and handloader components." Id.
119. City of Seattle v. Shin, 50 Wash. App. 218, 221 748 P.2d 643, 646 (1988).
120. 92 Wash. 2d 342, 596 P.2d 1044 (1979).
121. Id at 343-44, 596 P.2d at 1044.
122. Id. at 345, 596 P.2d at 1045.
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expressly limiting local legislation. Nevertheless, the court did find
that the legislature had intended to preempt the field of obscenity.'
23
The court first considered whether the legislature had intended to
create a uniform standard. The mere fact that the legislature enacted
a statute in a subject area previously had not been considered by the
Washington Supreme Court to show the need for a uniform stan-
dard.124 The court in Portch, however, considered the potential first
amendment ramifications and held that the enactment of the statute in
this case did show a legislative intent for a uniform standard.125 The
court also found that the quantity and specificity of the state law
served to further indicate an intent of preemption. 126 In reliance on
these two factors, the supreme court held that the field of obscenity
had been preempted by implication.
This holding may have a chilling effect on home rule. A municipal-
ity's freedom to enact regulations will be severely restricted if Wash-
ington courts frequently apply the implied preemption doctrine.
Without a judicial ruling, a municipality would not be certain whether
it could regulate a subject area. The supreme court has seemingly rec-
ognized this potential for undesirable judicial intervention, however,
and has relied on this doctrine infrequently.'27
Although the taxonomy developed above is of assistance in deter-
mining when a court will find conflict between general laws and
municipal ordinances or charters, it is by no means a wholly accurate
means of prediction. As with the interpretation of a municipal grant
of power, the courts have not yet developed a consistent policy for
dealing with cases involving conflict. In some cases, a court will refuse
to find laws inconsistent unless they are in direct conflict.' 28 In other
cases, a court will find conflict if the state has acted in a subject area at
all.' 29 Judicial discretion in determining the proper relationship of
state and local government powers makes it difficult to predict when a
conflict will be found.
123. Id. at 347-48, 596 P.2d at 1045-47.
124. City of Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wash. 2d 106, 109, 356 P.2d 292, 296 (1960).
125. "We do not believe that the legislature intended to permit individualized systems of
obscenity prohibition which may serve to chill protected First Amendment expression within the
state. Rather, it seems clear that the legislature intended to create a uniform system of obscenity
prohibition when it enacted R.C.W. 9.68." 92 Wash. 2d at 348, 596 P.2d at 1046.
126. Id.
127. The author has been unable to locate any cases relying on this doctrine of implied
preemption since Portch.
128. Andersen, supra note 2.
129. Id.
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III. PROPOSALS FOR MEANINGFUL HOME RULE
One century ago, the framers of Washington's constitution were for-
ward thinking enough to recognize the need for home rule, and to
provide in the original constitution what they believed to be the neces-
sary means to achieve it. Due to the rapid population growth of our
municipalities and the concomitant expansion of local services and
responsibilities, local autonomy is even more imperative today. How-
ever, primarily due to narrow judicial interpretation of home rule
grants and legislative inaction, municipal governments lack the ability
to self-govern. Washington needs to develop a constitutional and stat-
utory structure in which home rule may flourish.
A. Broaden the Grant of Municipal Power
The key to increasing municipal home rule is to reduce the uncer-
tainty that pervades Washington home rule. Because of the unpredict-
ability of judicial decisions in this area, local government officials are
unable to determine accurately if an ordinance they enact will be
upheld under a home rule grant of power. As a result, they hesitate to
enact any ordinances at all. 130 One solution to this uncertainty-engen-
dered inaction would be to broaden the grant of municipal power.
Currently, the most reliable method of determining the validity of a
local law is for the municipal government to ask for an express delega-
tion from the legislature. For example, in the past decade, the City of
Seattle has sought special authority from the legislature to enact ordi-
nances for protection of the city's watershed, consumer protection,
regulation of libraries, and a variety of other city functions. 131 With a
state legislature that only meets part-time, this is an extraordinarily
inefficient state of affairs. 132 This inefficiency could be virtually elimi-
nated by the passage of a constitutional amendment granting to
municipalities the power to do anything that the legislature has the
constitutional power to grant, and has not specifically prohibited. 133
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. The Washington Legislature is limited to a 105-day regular session in odd-numbered
years and a 60-day regular session in even-numbered years. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 12.
133. The amendment could be worded similarly to the National League of Cities, Model
Constitutional Provisions for Municipal Home Rule which provides:
A municipal corporation which adopts a home rule charter may exercise any power or
perform any function which the legislature has power to devolve upon a non-home rule
charter municipal corporation and which is not denied to that municipal corporation by its
home rule charter, is not denied to all home rule charter municipal corporations by statute,
and is within such limitations as may be established by statute. This devolution of power
does not include the power to enact private or civil law governing civil relationships except
Washington Law Review
Absent constitutional or statutory prohibitions, this amendment
would allow a municipality the independence to develop its own ordi-
nances, free from the need to apply to the legislature for specific
grants. This amendment would also effectively shift the primary
responsibility for determining the scope of municipal home rule pow-
ers from the judiciary to the state legislature. The legislature is a bet-
ter forum in which to determine the scope of home rule powers. As an
elected body, the state legislature can assure at least some municipal
representation through each municipality's state representatives. In
addition, the legislature, as a policy-making body, has the expertise in
distributing power lacking in the judiciary. Although the judiciary's
role would be lessened under this amendment, the courts would con-
tinue to resolve state and local law conflicts.
A complementary structural change should take place in the judici-
ary. Judicial construction necessarily plays a key role in the effective-
ness of any amendment, for the court has the last word in
constitutional interpretation. The court could play an active role in
ending the ambiguity and confusion which its troubled record has
sown. First, the supreme court could consistently adhere to its own
precedent. Presently, a municipality can never be certain whether the
court will follow a strict interpretative approach, as in Massie, or a
more liberal construction. 134 Rather than citing a line of cases nar-
rowly or broadly construing the scope of municipal power in order to
reach a desired result, the court could establish a clear standard on
which practitioners and government officials could rely in establishing
policy and regulations. Consistency from the court would be a signifi-
cant step toward the reduction of the current uncertainty.
Second, the court could deemphasize its reliance on Dillon's Rule.
Dillon's Rule was developed in an era of distrust of municipal govern-
ments and therefore is not as meaningful today.1 5  Most modern
municipal officials are at least as competent as state legislators. The
size and sophistication of first-class and charter code municipalities
require these officials to act quickly and responsively. The delay
as incident to an exercise of an independent municipal power, nor does it include power to
define and provide for punishment of a felony.
AMERICAN MUNICIPAL LEAGUE (NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES), MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 19 (1953), quoted in Vanlandingham, supra note 97,
at 6.
134. Andersen, supra note 2.
135. Dillon stated in reference to municipal officials that those "best fitted by their
intelligence, business experience, capacity, and moral character" do not hold municipal positions.
1 J. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 9, at 85-86 (2d ed. 1873), quoted in
Note, supra note 42, at 656 n.24 (emphasis omitted).
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inherent in Dillon's Rule of express delegation makes it difficult for
these administrators to perform their jobs adequately.
Finally, the supreme court could give greater weight to the intent of
the legislature. The legislature has, on a number of occasions, clearly
expressed its intent that home rule powers were to be liberally con-
strued.1 36 Yet the court in many cases continues to follow a strict
construction of statutes regarding municipal power regardless of the
legislature's intent.1 37 Full recognition of legislative intent is a prereq-
uisite to the effectiveness of any broad grant of municipal power.
Although these recommendations may ameliorate difficulties inher-
ent in a narrow grant of home rule power, they do nothing to prevent
the legislature and courts from denying power to municipalities
through the strict application of the conflict clause.1 3s These problems
would have to be rectified through constitutional amendments provid-
ing for a sphere of immunity.
B. Provide a Sphere of Immunity for Municipalities
Under article XI, sections 10 and 11, the legislature has the ability
to supersede a municipality on any subject matter, state or local. This
allows the state legislature to enact general laws on purely local affairs
such as matters regarding the recall of city council members 39 and the
establishment of crematories within the city limits. 14 A preferable
approach is to enact a constitutional amendment providing a sphere of
immunity that would give local governments freedom to act without
legislative intervention. 4 ' Municipal laws regulating purely local
affairs would supersede state laws on the same subject. This amend-
ment would be beneficial for a number of reasons.
A sphere of municipal immunity over local affairs would prohibit
the state legislature from involving itself in affairs that can be best
handled by local government.142 As a result, the state legislature
136. See supra notes 67-69 (statutory language expressly providing for liberal interpretation
of statutes regarding municipal power).
137. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (strict interpretation of statutes regarding
home rule powers under Massie decision).
138. See supra text accompanying note 33.
139. State ex rel. Lynch v. Fairley, 76 Wash. 332, 136 P. 374 (1913).
140. Oakwood Co. v. Tacoma Mausoleum Ass'n, 22 Wash. 2d 692, 157 P.2d 595 (1945).
141. California has adopted such a provision. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 6 (1879, amended
1970).
142. The following is a response by the Association of Washington Cities to a questionnaire
sent by Professor Vanlandingham in October 1965:
Legislative bodies are subject to extreme political pressures from special interest groups with
private axes to grind. The will of these groups is often given much greater consideration
because of campaign contributions, etc., than the recommendations of the duly constituted
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would be spared the burden of having to spend its limited time on
issues that could be more effectively handled at a local level. In addi-
tion, a sphere of municipal immunity would encourage citizen partici-
pation in local government. Currently, citizens and local government
leaders may shy away from participation because there is a significant
likelihood that their work will be overturned by the courts. Under a
sphere of immunity amendment, however, citizens would have the
incentive to work at innovative solutions to local problems without the
fear of their work being negated by the courts.
The difficulty in defining "municipal affairs" presents a drawback to
permitting a sphere of immunity in municipal affairs. Because it is vir-
tually impossible for a legislature to draft a totally comprehensive defi-
nition, the courts will ultimately be the branch of government forced
to make this decision. This judicial case-by-case definition process will
likely result in significant uncertainty. Municipalities will not be cer-
tain whether the subject matter of the ordinance they contemplate
enacting is a "municipal affair" until the courts have ruled on the
question.
To avoid the problems of judicial definition of "municipal affairs,"
Washington could adopt a complementary constitutional amendment,
such as that recently passed in Kansas.143 This amendment provides
for a broad grant of municipal power, subject only to "uniform" state
legislative acts. Except in cases of taxation, extraterritorial affairs, and
municipal incorporation, where state involvement is arguably more
essential, home rule municipalities may exempt themselves from state
laws which are not uniformly applied to all cities. This structure
allows an environment conducive to the development of home rule.
Washington could adopt such an amendment in conjunction with a
sphere of immunity amendment to preserve local autonomy in
"municipal affairs." With a sphere of immunity amendment standing
alone, immunity is granted to municipalities only on issues that are
purely local. There are few areas of regulation in which no state inter-
est could be found. Thus, the courts and the state legislature could
local authorities. Unless cities are given some specific powers which the legislature cannot
constantly override, the whole concept of home rule is in shambles. The legislature, in other
words, will constantly go over the heads of local officials to appease an interest group,
hamstringing an administration, or place undue burdens on cities without providing the
funds to pay the bill.
Vanlandingham, supra note 4, at 296 n.142.
143. See generally Clark, State Control of Local Government in Kansas: Special Legislation
and Home Rule, 20 KAN L. REV. 631 (1972) (discussing Kansas amendment).
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pierce the sphere at will by classifying an area as one of joint state and
local interest.
Under the uniformity amendment, however, in conjunction with the
sphere of immunity amendment, only legitimate areas of joint interest
would supersede municipal regulations. If the state has a legitimate
joint interest-for example, uniform statewide traffic markings-then
it could enact a general law, uniformly applied to all municipalities,
that would supersede municipal regulations. If, however, the legisla-
ture enacts laws aimed at fewer than all municipalities, each local gov-
ernment would have the right to exempt itself from the legislation.
This constitutional amendment would ensure meaningful local auton-
omy over "municipal affairs."
Under such an amendment, the courts would continue to adjudicate
questions of constitutionality and the limits of legislative delegation.
The role of the courts would be limited, however, to making determi-
nations of what is uniformly applicable. Presumably, a state law
would fall short of being uniform if it was not applied to all home rule
municipalities. 1
These three amendments, the broad grant of power amendment, the
sphere of immunity amendment, and the uniformity amendment,
would solve a number of the difficulties of Washington home rule
today. The broad grant of power amendment would eliminate the
need for local governments to wait for an express delegation before
they can act. The sphere of municipal immunity amendment would
create an area in which the municipality's ordinance would reign
supreme, thus dispensing with the problem of excessive legislative
involvement in local affairs. Finally, the uniformity amendment
would eliminate much of the ambiguity inherent in the judicial deter-
mination of conflict and prevent the circumvention of the municipal
affairs immunity by the legislature through special legislation dis-
guised as general laws. Critical to the effectiveness of each of these
amendments is a judiciary committed to meaningful local self-
governance.
IV. CONCLUSION
The home rule currently practiced in Washington is, in many ways,
illusory. The intent our founders had in developing the home rule
provisions has not been realized. Constitutional changes, as well as
changes in judicial interpretation, are needed to develop the environ-
ment necessary for local autonomy. Only through a concerted effort
144. Id. at 657 n.106.
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by the courts, the legislature, and the citizens of this state can home
rule in Washington become a reality.
Michael Monroe Kellogg Sebree
